

The Cities that Never Were. Failed Attempts at Colonization in the Black Sea

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Introduction

The title of this paper is taken from a book that appeared a few years ago, *The Land That Never Was*, about one of the most spectacular frauds in history.¹ In the year 1823 a group of Scots set out to the small but supposedly well run Territory of Poyais on the Mosquito Coast, in what is now Honduras. Here they had bought or commissioned land from a certain Sir Gregor McGregor, Cazique of Poyais, who had made the venture credible by having produced a brochure and a 350-page guide to the prosperous town with its many profitable plantations and blossoming commerce.² Upon arrival after crossing the Atlantic during the winter, the new settlers found nothing there – absolutely nothing, except a few huts occupied by natives. Few of the unfortunate colonists survived the first year in their new home.

There may have been similar attempts in Antiquity at overselling the idea of going away to the Black Sea to settle. What interests me here, however, is the fact that not all attempts at founding colonies ended in success, neither in the early 19th century nor in Antiquity. The initial settlers of a new colony almost always found themselves in a very precarious situation and many factors contributed to the viability of the new *apoikia*. This paper intends to explore how the Greek-barbarian relationship affected the outcome of the colonial encounter at a macro level; how, to my mind, they were an important element in determining the Greek settlement pattern in the Black Sea region and possibly vice versa: what the particular settlement patterns, we can observe in the region, might reveal about the nature of these relations.

Research on Greek colonization has always largely focussed the successes. There are some very obvious reasons behind this. For one thing the source material for the cities that were never there compares unfavourably with those that were – both archaeologically and in the literary tradition. Consequently, some of the evidence for the topic must be the very absence of such evidence. Still, something might be learned from looking for the failures as well. This involves both particular cases of unsuccessful colonies, as well as

more general considerations as to why certain areas remained unsettled by the Greeks.

Characteristics of the settlement pattern

The first thing that springs to mind when looking at a map of the Greek colonization of the Black Sea region is that all the colonies were restricted to the coast and very often appear at the mouths of rivers. Easily defendable positions on peninsulas with good harbourage were clearly preferred. Greek-speaking people definitely appear at sites in the hinterland in smaller or larger groups at different times,³ but the Greek cities were exclusively on the coast. The distance between the *poleis* in the Black Sea region in the Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic periods was considerably greater than in the Aegean and in Magna Graecia. This does not necessarily imply that city territories were correspondingly larger. In many instances the territories of the cities did not form a continuum even at a very late date.

Large parts of the Black Sea coastline were never colonized by the Greeks, and some areas even seem to have been little explored. Knowledge about the geography and the people living there, particularly in the hinterland, was



Fig. 1. Greek cities in the Black Sea around 500 BC. The cities Hermonassa, Kepoi, Kimmerikon, Korokondame, Myrmekion, Nymphaion, Patraeus, Porthmion, Tyritake and Thyrambe at the Kimmerian Bosphoros are not included on the map.

meagre at best. Yet travelling time could not have been the only prohibitive obstacle. The sea could be crossed north-south in a night and a day from Cape Karambis to Krioumétopon in the Crimea,⁴ and the journey from Byzantium to even the remotest parts of the Black Sea, such as Phasis, could be made in about a week.⁵ Other reasons must be sought as to why some areas in the Black Sea felt remote and unknown to the Greeks.

One of the curiosities of the settlement pattern is that the earliest signs of settlements are located very far from the entrance to the Black Sea, at Berezan' and Taganrog in particular. While the colonization of the Propontis gradually extended the presence of Greek cities, once the barrier of the Bosphorus had been broken, we immediately find Greek pottery far to the north in the forest steppe at, for example, Nemirov and Bel'sk.⁶ The Greek pottery from before the middle of the 7th century, however, occurs in extremely limited quantities. Contrary to, for example, the early colonization of Sicily and South Italy, colonization in the Black Sea progressed very slowly, and until the beginning of the 6th century there were probably as few as six or seven permanent Greek settlements in the entire Black Sea region.⁷

Greek-barbarian relations

Our view of Greek colonization has of course affected the way the question of settlement pattern has been studied, and our understanding of Greek-barbarian relations has indeed changed considerably over time. During much of the 20th century, the Greek cities in the Black Sea and elsewhere for that matter were seen as "mere islets of civilization in a sea of barbarism", surrounded by tribes so culturally different from the Greeks and so insufficiently advanced that they were unable to assimilate to Greek culture, to use the words of A.H.M. Jones in *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* from 1940.⁸ This view did not leave much room for interaction between Greeks and non-Greeks. It amounted at the most to Greek exploitation of the local tribes. More recent scholarship has pointed out that interdependence, peaceful co-existence and exchange constituted to a far greater extent the governing principle of relationships. Naturally, there were vast chronological and regional differences, and generalisations should be treated with caution. What the Greeks experienced in the north of the Black Sea in the Archaic period was vastly different from that of the south in the Hellenistic period. Recently, in particular the friendly relations between the Ionian and Milesian adventurers, traders and settlers and the indigenous peoples during the initial phase of the Greek penetration into the Black Sea has been highlighted.⁹ At this time the Greeks were particularly vulnerable, and it is doubtful whether the Greeks would have stood a chance of survival without the consent and help of the locals.

Three indicators have been brought forward in support of the notion of amicable relations:

- 1) At most sites in the early period, the 7th century, the high percentage of hand-made pottery among the Greek pottery indicates that at least part of the population may have been indigenous and that more ethnic groups lived in peaceful co-existence.¹⁰ The question of “who uses whose pots” is hotly debated, and it remains a question whether the presence of ceramics made in different traditions reveals anything except that contact and exchange of some sort occurred.
- 2) At no cities, with the exception of Istros, have fortification systems dated before the 5th century BC been identified.¹¹ The excavator at Istros, M. Coja, dates the initial phase of the city wall around 575-550 BC,¹² but others have suggested a somewhat later date.¹³ Recently, finds of 6th-century fortifications at Porthmion have weakened this argument for entirely peaceful relations somewhat.¹⁴ Furthermore, just because no fortifications have been identified it does not necessarily follow that they were not there. Could the colonists at the initial stage of foundation generate the necessary surplus to construct masonry fortifications? The type of fortifications typically employed must have been earthen ramparts with palisades, and these do not always leave as obvious traces in the archaeological record.
- 3) There are no signs of destruction at sites in the northern Black Sea region in the 7th and 6th centuries.¹⁵ Only towards the end of the 6th century does the situation seem to change, and thus destruction layers have been found at, for example, Porthmion.¹⁶

According to E.K. Petropoulos, the Milesian involvement in the Black Sea was carried out according to a master plan: “In this fashion, two, possibly three permanent settlements (emporía?) had as their major concern the further acquisition and appropriation of the lands of the Northern Pontos, while their ultimate goal was the successful mass immigration which was to follow”.¹⁷ However, when the Milesians began to establish trading relations in the northern Black Sea around the middle of the 7th century, no one could have foreseen the troubles with the Lydians and Persians that would later befall the Greek cities in western Asia Minor.

The white spots on the map

As time passed, an increasing number of Greek cities were created around the Black Sea – in the words of Platon, “like frogs around a pond”.¹⁸ Yet some areas remained devoid of Greek settlements, albeit not of population. All around the Black Sea there were people living in villages and towns, perhaps not always on the coast but at least in the coastal zone and in the hinterland. Most conspicuous in their lack of Greek cities are the southern coast of the Crimea and the coast along the Caucasus from Pityous to Torikos, but also long stretches on both sides of the entrance to the Black Sea through the Thracian Bosphoros, the area east of the Dnieper and much of the western Crimea

saw no Greek presence (Fig. 1). Why do these white spots on the map exist? At the most basic level there can be two explanations: 1) the Greeks did not want to settle in these areas; or 2) the local population in the area did not allow the Greeks to settle there. The first may be true in some instances. Parts of the coastlines mentioned did not offer enough land suitable for agriculture to sustain a large city. More often, however, the Greeks seem to have been deterred from settling by the groups already occupying the land, who in addition to agriculture or pasturing, also operated as part-time pirates. This at least is a common trait of all the abovementioned areas. Of course one could ask whether piracy was prevalent in certain areas because there were no Greek cities to exercise control and offer protection, or whether there were no Greek cities because of the widespread piracy and brigandage. A discussion of piracy in the Black Sea can be found elsewhere,¹⁹ so in this context it is necessary merely to point out that the piratical raids could be highly organised and their sphere of operations quite extensive. Pirates from the eastern part of the Black Sea may have roamed as far as the western coast at a later period, or at least that's what Ovid suggests.²⁰ Opposition from local tribes was a factor to be reckoned with. Below I shall discuss the situation at the entrance to the Black Sea, but in the southwestern Crimea, Taurian tribes also seem to have been successful at keeping Greeks from settling permanently. At Tauric Chersonesos, which has the safest harbour in the Black Sea area by far, small quantities of Greek pottery have turned up from the 6th century BC onwards. It remains a question whether this signifies a continuous Greek presence.²¹ Only with the foundation of a seemingly highly militarised colony from Herakleia towards the end of the 5th century did the Greeks manage to establish themselves permanently in southern Crimea.

Who was wearing the pants in the Black Sea Region?

Were the Greeks the only ones to decide where to settle? Perhaps to a large extent the Greek cities were only established with the consent of the local population, who in many instances were "wearing the pants", so to speak. Very often in accounts of conflicts between the Greeks and the barbarians, the barbarians have the upper hand. To Dion of Prusa, writing about Olbia at the end of the first century AD, this was a matter of fact:

The city of Borysthenes, as to its size, does not correspond to its ancient fame, because of its ever repeated seizure and its wars. For since the city has lain in the midst of barbarians now for so long a time – barbarians, too, who are virtually the most warlike of all – it is always in a state of war and has often been captured, the last and most disastrous capture occurring not more than one hundred and fifty years ago. And the Getae on that occasion seized not only Borysthenes but also the other cities along the

left shore of Pontus as far as Apollonia. For that reason the fortunes of the Greeks in that region reached a very low ebb indeed, some of them being no longer united to form cities, while others enjoyed but a wretched existence as communities, and it was mostly barbarians who flocked to them. Indeed many cities have been captured in many parts of Greece, inasmuch as Greece lies scattered in many regions. But after Borysthenes had been taken on the occasion mentioned, its people once more formed a community, with the consent of the Scythians, I imagine, because of their need for traffic with the Greeks who might use that port. For the Greeks had stopped sailing to Borysthenes when the city was laid waste, inasmuch as they had no people of common speech to receive them, and the Scythians themselves had neither the ambition nor the knowledge to equip a trading-centre of their own after the Greek manner (Dion Chrysostomos, *Discourses* 36.4-5 (Loeb)).

Dion wrote about 750 years after the first establishment of a Greek trading station on Berezan', and of course the nature of the relationship did not remain constant throughout this entire period. However, there are strong indicators to the effect that the fortunes of Olbia to a large extent depended on co-operation with the various tribes that dominated the surrounding territory throughout the city's history, since we can detect a synchronicity between the prosperity of Olbia and the nomadic and semi-nomadic cultures in the hinterland.²² In this connection it is also worth asking why there are no other Greek cities for at least 100 km along the coast to the east and the west of Olbia. Was it always the city of Olbia that extended its influence over this vast territory?

The barbarian point of view

Why did the Greeks go to the Black Sea to settle? What did they seek? These are familiar questions to which nearly as many answers have been given as the number of scholars writing on the subject: they came for metals (in the south-eastern part of the Black Sea), grain (from the northern shore), slaves (from the north and the east), timber (from the south), cattle, fish etc., or they came as unwilling colonists simply due to their need for land or as political refugees. The assumption is invariably that the Greeks were the active players who went abroad to fulfil a particular need of theirs, and this determined where they would settle. Following the same logic, the reason for the absence of Greek colonies is that nothing could be gained from that particular region. If we accept the idea that the power balance in many instances was in favour of the indigenous population, then it may be useful to rephrase the question: Why did the barbarians allow the Greeks to settle within their sphere of influence? What did they gain from the Greek presence? Did the cunning

Greeks simply cheat them into selling their riches for a bag of beads – or an amphora of sour wine?

We tend to think of the Greek colonies as a source of income for the Greeks, but they were often just as much a source of income for the locals. The Greek colonies served as outlets of surplus generated in the hinterland for the benefit of those controlling the trade routes. The imports from the Greek world also offered the local elites a way to manifest themselves and emphasise social differences. Furthermore, the moment the Greek cities developed from being mostly of emporian nature into agrarian communities, many began paying tribute or outright protection money to local chiefs. The predicament of extortion seems to have increased in the Hellenistic period. Normally, the obligation to pay tribute fell upon the cities, but honorary inscriptions, in particular from the western and northern cities, reveal that private individuals also paid large sums of money on behalf of the cities in order to avoid attacks.²³ The collection of tribute by local tribes was a widely accepted practice and tolerated as a sort of land lease as long as the amounts assessed stayed reasonable.²⁴ Only excessive demands called for moral judgement.

The economic significance of the Greek colonies to the local population – both positive and negative, I think – ought to figure far more prominently in the discussion of the settlement pattern.

Failed attempts

The first story that springs to mind when thinking of failed attempts at establishing a colony is that of Herodotos (4.150-158) about the unfortunate Theraians, who only in their third attempt and with the aid of the Libyans managed to create a viable settlement, namely Kyrene.²⁵ The Theraians were not the only ones to experience problems in establishing themselves in Libya – so did the Spartans later (Hdt. 5.42). The colonies in Libya were, to judge from Herodotos' account, clearly of an agrarian nature. The settlers left because of repeated crop failure on Thera, and they meant to establish a self-sufficient community abroad. Scarcity of precipitation at the first two locations chosen drove them on in further search of new land. Relations with the Libyans were initially amicable but tension grew with the continued influx of Greeks to Kyrene demanding still larger tracts of land. The Libyans sought help from the Egyptian king and war followed, which surprisingly turned out to the advantage of the Greeks.

We lack comparable stories from the Black Sea. As could be expected, we hear of the foundation histories or foundation myths of the colonies that survived and developed into city-states. Likewise we would probably never have heard about the two unsuccessful attempts by the Theraians had Kyrene not turned out to be so successful – say, if the Theraians who remained on the island had welcomed the unfortunate colonists back home after the first attempt instead of showering them with missiles as they tried to enter the

harbour. It would, however, be highly surprising if no such instances occurred in the Black Sea.

Sinope

Sinope may possibly be a case in point. The question of the founding and the foundation date of Sinope has been discussed at length without reaching a final conclusion.²⁶ Adherents of an 8th-century Greek foundation as suggested by Eusebius can still be found, although the position seems very difficult to attain due to the lack of any archaeological remains of such an early Greek presence. The main point still in dispute is whether there had already been a Milesian colony lead by an *oikistes* Habron or Habrondas before the Kimmerian invasion, as stated by Ps.-Skymnos (986-997), which the Kimmerians expelled. Later, according to Ps.-Skymnos, when the Kimmerians moved on, two Milesian exiles, Koos and Kretinos, managed to establish a town at the site again. I shall not enter into a discussion about the date or even the existence of a Kimmerian invasion, but simply present the possibility that even if we do not trust the information concerning the role of the Kimmerians in the foundation of Sinope, the story about the double foundation may not necessarily be erroneous. There were other forces in the area that could have caused problems for the colonists. What the Milesians found on the Sinop promontory was not *terra nullius*. Before the arrival of the Greeks, there were certainly people living at a number of sites in the coastal zone, such as Sinop Kale, Gerze and Akliman, who already had interregional contacts.²⁷ Perhaps it was conflict with these people that lead to the destruction of the initial colony under the leadership of Habron. Later the event was put under the more familiar heading of the Kimmerian invasion with resulting chronological problems for modern scholars. Perhaps there were indeed two separate foundations of Sinope, both occurring in the 7th century BC.

Kalpe Limen

The best example of a city “that never was” is at a location called Kalpe Limen or simply Kalpe, which most probably corresponds to the present-day locality of Kirpe approximately 90 km to the east of the entrance to the Black Sea. In 399 BC, Xenophon, returning with the Greek army after the disastrous campaign of Kyros the Younger, seriously considered establishing a colony here. His account of the place reveals many of the considerations that governed the choice of a site for the establishment of a colony. It is worth to quote the passage in full:

During that day they bivouacked where they were, upon the beach by the harbour. Now this place, which is called Calpe Harbour is situated in Thrace-in-Asia; and this portion of Thrace begins at

the mouth of the Euxine and extends as far as Heracleia, being on the right as one sails into the Euxine. It is a long day's journey for a trireme to row from Byzantium to Heracleia, and between the two places there is no other city, either friendly or Greek, only Bithynian Thracians; and they are said to abuse outrageously any Greeks they may find shipwrecked or may capture in any other way. As for Calpe Harbour, it lies midway of the voyage between Heracleia and Byzantium and is a bit of land jutting out into the sea, the part of it which extends seaward being a precipitous mass of rock, not less than twenty fathoms high at its lowest point, and the isthmus which connects this head with the mainland being about four *plethra* in width; and the space to the seaward of the isthmus is large enough for ten thousand people to dwell in. At the very foot of the rock there is a harbour whose beach faces toward the west, and an abundantly flowing spring of fresh water close to the shore of the sea and commanded by the headland. There is also a great deal of timber of various sorts, but an especially large amount of fine ship-timber, on the very shore of the sea. The ridge extends back into the interior for about twenty stadia, and this stretch is deep-soiled and free from stones, while the land bordering the coast is thickly covered for a distance of more than twenty stadia with an abundance of heavy timber of all sorts. The rest of the region is fair and extensive, and contains many inhabited villages; for the land produces barley, wheat, beans of all kinds, millet and sesame, a sufficient quantity of figs, an abundance of grapes which yield a good sweet wine, and in fact everything except olives (Xenophon, *An.* 6.4.1-6 (Loeb)).

What Xenophon describes seems to approximate the ideal situation for a colony, but one question we might reasonably have expected Xenophon to have asked himself remains unanswered: why had a Greek city not already been built at the spot? Clearly no permanent installations existed at the site when the Greek army arrived there, neither defensive, nor residential, nor commercial. There could be reasons why Xenophon wanted to exaggerate the splendour of the site. For one thing, he actually did not carry the project through. Although tempted by the prospect of becoming the founder, *ktistes*, of a city, he abandoned the idea because of the strong opposition it met among his fellow officers. Xenophon himself was not particularly eager to return to Greece where he had been exiled from Athens, and already at the army's first approach to the Black Sea at Trapezous, he had contemplated going into the Kolchian territory to found a colony.

Back to the site: The distance from the Byzantium to Heracleia amounts to more than 200 km, so it must indeed have taken a long day's rowing to cover

the distance, and sailing vessels would certainly have had to put in somewhere on the coast. Furthermore, this stretch of land was considered seriously dangerous because of the local tribes, whom Xenophon calls Bithynian Thracians and who took hostage anyone shipwrecked or captured, and when it became known that a city was being founded, Greek ships immediately began to put in there (6.6.3-4). There was obviously a great need for a safe port on this part of the coast. One possible reason for the absence of a city at Kalpe could be that the place already lay within the sphere of influence of Herakleia. But why should the Herakleians not have been interested in establishing a strongpoint at Kalpe or somewhere else on the coast to relieve the problem of piracy? Furthermore, there is nothing in Xenophon to suggest that Herakleia exercised any form of control over the area. My guess would be that the Bithynians, who seem to have lived in a network of villages a short distance from the coast, previously had prevented the establishment of a permanent Greek settlement at Kalpe.²⁸ Perhaps they were perfectly happy carrying on the lucrative business of ransoming unfortunate Greek sailors. The one difference that set Xenophon's situation apart was that he was, if not in charge, then at least a highly influential figure among a fighting force of about 8600 highly trained soldiers (counted at Kotyora) – without comparison the strongest Greek force present in the Black Sea region till then. Previously, the Greeks had lacked sufficient strength to settle at Kalpe. But once the Greeks displayed that strength, the hostile people living in the neighbourhood had no choice and began to send envoys to ask for friendship (6.6.3-4).

On the left-hand side of the Black Sea, entering from the Bosporos, a comparable situation prevailed at Salmydessos, which seems to have been a Thracian stronghold and a centre for piratical activities.²⁹ As at Kalpe Limen, the main reason for the lack of a Greek city there seems to have been strong local opposition.

Chalkedon

One of the most curious moments in the early colonial process is the foundation of Chalkedon. Not so much that it was founded, but that it was founded 17 years earlier than Byzantion. This also struck the ancients as highly curious: when the Persian general Megabazos learned this, he exclaimed that the future Chalkedonians had been labouring under blindness at the time (Hdt. 4.144), because the site of Byzantion right across the straight was vastly superior with regard to defence and harbour facilities. There may have been other reasons. One obvious suggestion could be that the local Thracians would not allow the Greeks to settle at Byzantion. Only some time after establishing a bridgehead at Chalkedon did it become possible to establish a colony on the European side of the Bosporos, and throughout much of its history conflict with the Thracians and other tribes would haunt the city.³⁰

The settlements that disappeared

Another type of what we might term failures were the settlements that disappeared or never developed into independent *poleis*. The settlement at for example Berezan' was in a sense a failed attempt. In the 7th century environment the location must have seemed perfect – an easily defensible peninsula at the very mouth of a large river. As it turned out, Berezan' mainly came to function as a steppingstone to the foundation of Olbia 40 km away, up the Bug River. Moving the centre of a city-state 40 km may not seem like much in a Black Sea context, but on the Greek mainland, for example, there could be as many as twenty fully-fledged *poleis* within a 40 km radius. Another example is the, until recently, little-explored site at Taganrog, which was established as a Milesian *emporion* around 630 BC but probably didn't survive much longer than the beginning of the 5th century. The reasons for its disappearance remain obscure. Perhaps its function as a trading station was taken over by other more suitably situated sites, but pressure from local tribes could equally be the reason why the settlement became unviable. Other sites like Pičvnari and Apsaros could be mentioned in this connection as well.³¹

Conclusion

We learn from our failures the saying goes. In the history of the colonization of the Black Sea area there is a lesson to be learned from the failures as well as from the successes. Presented above are a few examples of the less successful attempts at Greek colonization in the Black Sea region. Many other sites with a similar fate probably never entered the pages of history.

Several factors determined the choice of sites for colonies and their chance of success. Easily defensible positions, very often on peninsulas; points of strategic importance for trade, typically at the mouth of navigable rivers; sites with good harbourage, and the presence of arable land were obviously preferred by settlers. These geographical requirements can still be discerned in the landscape today. The demographic situation around the Black Sea and the nature of the relations between the Greek settlers and the indigenous population is, on the other hand, much more elusive. It rests primarily on scattered references in the literary sources. This may explain why this important factor hitherto has received comparatively little attention.

Notes

- 1 Sinclair 2003.
- 2 The guide, entitled *Sketch of the Mosquito Chore, including the Territory of Poyais, descriptive of the country*, had appeared in 1822.
- 3 For example, at Pistiros, where an inscription from the first half of the fourth century BC mentions Greek *emporitai* (Velkov & Domaradzka 1996, 205-216). At

- Semibratnee a Greek dedication for Leukon I from the 360's BC has been found (latest Jajlenko 2004, 425-445). Finally 2nd century BC dedications by a certain Posideos at Scythian Neapolis (*IOSPE I²*, 671-672).
- 4 Ps.-Skymnos 998-1000.
 - 5 "To sail from the entrance of the Black Sea to Phasis is a voyage of nine days and eight nights" (Hdt. 4.85). Byzantion to Herakleia: one long day of rowing (Xen., *An.* 6.4.2); Herakleia to Sinope: two days of sailing (Xen., *An.* 6.2.1); Sinope to Phasis: two or three days sailing (Strab. 11.2.17).
 - 6 Petropoulos 2005, 29-32 for discussion; Vachtina 2007.
 - 7 Kacharava 2005, 11-16.
 - 8 Jones 1940, 27.
 - 9 Petropoulos 2005; Tsetskhladze 2002, 90.
 - 10 Tsetskhladze 2002, 83.
 - 11 Tolstikov 1997.
 - 12 Coja 1986, 95-103.
 - 13 For a discussion, see Frederiksen 2003, cat. no. 112.
 - 14 Vachtina 2003, 51-52. At nearby Myrmekion another Archaic city wall has been reported.
 - 15 Tsetskhladze 2002, 83.
 - 16 Vachtina 2003, 52.
 - 17 Petropoulos 2005, 65.
 - 18 Pl. *Phaedo* 109B.
 - 19 Tsetskhladze 2000-2001, 11-15.
 - 20 Ov. *Epistulae ex Ponto*, 4.10.25-30. See however Asheri 1998 for the *topos* of the savage Caucasians.
 - 21 Zolotarev (1993; 1995, 138-151) has proposed that the pottery represents an early Greek settlement. See also Vinogradov 1997, 397-419.
 - 22 Archibald 2002, 56.
 - 23 The most famous is the decree for Protogenes from Olbia (*IOSPE I²*, 32).
 - 24 Strab. 7.4.6.
 - 25 Osborne (1996, 8-17) illuminates the varying interests of the different players in the different versions of the foundation history circulating in the 5th and 4th centuries BC. However, both the Theraian and the Kyreneian versions agree upon the initial failed attempts and the aid of the Libyan natives in finally settling in Kyrene.
 - 26 For the foundation of Sinope, see Ivantchik 2005, 135-161; 1998, 297-330; Tsetskhladze 1994. Graham (1958, 25-42; 1994, 4-5) and Drews (1976, 18-31) has strongly advocated the early foundation date.
 - 27 Doonan 2004, 51-67.
 - 28 Stronk (1991, 97-108) has previously suggested the hostility of the local population as an explanation for the non-existence of a colony at Kalpe Limen.
 - 29 Stronk 1986-1987, 63-70.
 - 30 Polyb. 4.46; Isaac 1986, 230-231. See, however, Malkin & Shmueli (1988, 21-36) for the view that Chalkedon was the terminus of the safest route for smaller vessels through the Propontis along the Asian side.
 - 31 At the conference Emzar Kakhidze, one of the excavators at Apsaros, reported 7th century BC material and destruction layers.

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Abbreviations

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